I. Introduction
It is generally accepted that the subsidy inherent in the current fixed-rate deposit insurance system creates perverse incentives for risk-taking by insured depository institutions (see Kane [1985] ). The ongoing deposit insurance debacle in the thrift industry has focused increasing attention on both the inherent defects and the potentially large costs associated with the current system of deposit guarantees, and on the need for fundamental reform.
Two alternative methods have been suggested for reducing the subsidy provided by the current deposit insurance system and thus the perverse incentives generated by mispriced deposit guarantees. The first is to rein in the subsidy through changes in explicit and implicit deposit insurance coverage and through the adoption of risk-based pricing of the deposit guarantees. A growing volume of literature has examined the feasibility of pricing deposit insurance (Flannery [1989] , Merton [1977, 19781, Ronn and Verma [1986] , and Pennacchi [1987] ); the impact of forbearance policies on the value of deposit insurance and insured depository institutions (Allen and Saunders [1990] , Osterberg and Thomson [1990] , and Thomson [1987a  and the incentive problems in the current deposit insurance contract (Kane [1989a .
The second way to reduce the deposit insurance subsidy is to alter the capital structure of banks so that the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is lessened. This can be accomplished by increasing the risk exposure of parties whose claims on the bank are subordinate to those of the FDIC. Baer (1985) , Benston et al. (1986, chapter 7), and Wall (1989) , among others, suggest that the FDIC's claim could be enhanced by requiring banks, as a condition of the insurance contract, to issue debt that is subordinate to the claims of depositors and the FDIC.
Another option, suggested by Kane (1987) , is to increase the liability of bank shareholders by requiring them to post surety bonds. This proposal would reestablish the double call provision that existed for shareholders of national banks and many state-chartered banks before the Banking Act of 1935 was adopted.' Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990) examine the empirical relationship between the risk premia on bank subordinated debt and balance-sheet measures of bank risk. Their studies find no conclusive evidence that, in the current regulatory environment, market risk premia on subordinated debt are related to risk proxies constructed from accounting data. These results contrast with those of earlier studies (Baer and Brewer [I9861 and Hannan and Hanweck [1988] , among others), which found a significant relationship between risk premia and risk proxies. This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the impact of subordinated debt and surety bonds on the cost of capital for banks and on the value of FDIC deposit guarantees. We agree with Gorton and Santomero's view that analyzing such proposals requires a more rigorous theoretical framework than has been generally applied. We extend the single-period cash-flow version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed in Chen (1978) and modified by Osterberg and Thomson (1990) to include mandatory subordinated debt. We also consider the impact of Kane's (1987) proposal to strengthen shareholder discipline by requiring shareholders to post surety bonds.
In section 11, we present the results of a single-period analysis of a bank that has both uninsured and insured deposits as derived in Osterberg and www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm We assume that all debt instruments are discount instruments, so that the total promised payment to all depositors and subordinated debtholders includes both principal and interest. In addition, we assume that the deposit insurance premium is paid at the end of the period.
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
In this section we present results from Osterberg and Thomson for a bank with only insured and uninsured deposits. The FDIC charges a fixed insurance premium of p on each dollar of insured deposits. The total liability claims against the bank, B, is the sum of the end-of-period promised payments to the uninsured depositors, Bu, the insured depositors, Bi, and the FDIC, z (=pBi). We assume that, on average, the FDIC underprices its deposit guarantees and, in the absence of regulatory taxes (Buser, Chen, and Kane [1981] ), provides a subsidy that reduces the cost of capital for banks while increasing their value.
Given these assumptions, it is clear that the end-of-period cash flows to the insured depositors, Ybi, equal the promised payments to insured depositors, Bi, in every state. Therefore, regardless of a bank's capital structure, the value, expected return, and cost of one dollar of insured deposits are Vbi = R -~B~, E ( % , ) = r, and r + p, respectively.
The end-of-period cash flows to the uninsured depositors depend on the promised payment to the uninsured depositors and on the total level of promised payments :
The value of the uninsured deposits and the required rate of return on these The value of equity and the expected return to stockholders are
Equation (4) shows that the cost of equity capital, like the cost of uninsured deposits, is a function of systematic risk, total promised payments, the probability of bankruptcy, the risk-free rate of return, and the deposit mix (when deposit insurance is mispriced). Equations (1) If the FDIC underprices its guarantees, it directly reduces the cost of insured deposits to banks. However, equations (2) and (4) its guarantees, and is equal to zero when deposit insurance is fairly priced.
The net value of FDIC guarantees is a function of the risk-free return, the probability of bankruptcy, the level of promised payments to depositors, the bank's systematic risk, and the deposit insurance premium. As a result, the pricing of subordinated debt capital should reflect bank risk and reduce the risk-taking incentives associated with the current deposit insurance system. This paper investigates the first of these two functions.
We indicate how the introduction of subordinated debt into a bank's capital structure influences the costs and values of deposits and equity capital and affects the value of the insurance subsidy. The introduction of subordinated debt has no impact on the value or cost of insured deposits.
For uninsured deposits, the introduction of subordinated debt into the capital structure results in the following end-of-period cash flows:
While the total promised payments to debtholders and the FDIC equal K, the effective bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors is K less the claims of the subordinated debtholders. The value of and the required rate of return on uninsured deposits are
and Comparing equations (7) and (8) to equations (1) and (2) shows that introducing subordinated debt into a bank's capital structure changes the value and cost of uninsured deposit capital by reducing the probability of loss for the uninsured depositors from F(B) to F(K-S).
To find the impact of subordinated debt on the value of uninsured deposits, we normalize the expected cash flows by the level of uninsured deposits and compare banks with and without subordinated debt in their capital structure. We then separate the expected cash flow to an uninsured deposit (with a par value of one dollar) in a bank with subordinated debt into two instruments: one that is identical to the uninsured deposit in section 11, and a second that has the following end-of-period payoffs:
If the value of AsYbu is positive (negative), then stochastic dominance requires the value of an uninsured deposit in a bank with subordinated debt to be greater (less) than its value without subordinated debt:
where, 6 = l/(K-S) -1/B. Equation (9) represents the additional value of the income stream accruing to one dollar of uninsured deposits when subordinated debt with face value S is issued. Equation (9) Therefore, the introduction of subordinated debt into a bank's capital structure increases the value of an uninsured deposit relative to its par value of one dollar.
The end-of-period expected cash flows accruing to the subordinated debtholders are
The value of the subordinated debt and the required rate of return on subordinated debt capital are
Equations (10) and (11) show that the cost and value of subordinated debt capital depend on the probability of bankruptcy, F(K), the face value of the subordinated debt, S, total promised payments, K, and the probability that senior claimants will not be repaid in full, F(K-S). Note that the last two terms in equation (10) The end-of-period cash flows accruing to stockholders are
The value of equity and the expected return to stockholders are
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm Subordinated debt affects the value and cost of equity capital through its effect on total promised payments and thus on the probability of bankruptcy.
For K greater (less) than B, subordinated debt reduces (increases) the value of equity capital because it increases (decreases) the probability of bankruptcy and reduces (increases) the residual cash flows in nonbankruptcy states. The impact of the proposal is therefore related to deposit insurance mispricing as well.
A comparison of equations (3) and (12) indicates that the change in the value of equity due to the imposition of a subordinated debt requirement is calculated as
Equation (15) indicates the value of a bank with subordinated debt in its capital structure:
Subordinated debt only affects the value of the bank through the net value of deposit insurance to the bank (the last three terms on the right side of
To calculate the effect of subordinated debt on the net value of the FDIC's guarantees, we compare the value of the FDIC's position in a bank with subordinated debt to the net FDIC subsidy presented in section 11. For a bank with subordinated debt, the end-of-period cash flows to the FDIC and the value of its position are
Equation (16) can be interpreted as showing that the equity-like buffer provided by subordinated debt affects the value of the FDIC's position by lowering the probability that the put options corresponding to the FDIC guarantee will be "in the money" at the end of the period.
To sign the direction of change in the value of the FDIC's position, we normalize equations (16) and (6) by the level of insured deposits and then subtract the net FDIC guarantee per dollar of insured deposits in section I1
from that in section 111. This results in equation (17):
Recall that if the FDIC underprices its guarantees, the value of its position in the bank is negative. Therefore, an increase in the value of the FDIC's claim on the bank represents a reduction in both the subsidy per dollar of insured deposits and in the value of the bank.
. .
IV. Banks' Cost of Capital and the Value of the Insurance Fund:
The Case of Surety Bonds Kane (1987) suggests stockholder-posted surety bonds as a mechanism for reducing the incentives for marginally solvent and insolvent depository institutions to gamble their way back to solvency. Requiring stockholders to post surety bonds would reestablish the double call provision on bank stockholders that was commonplace before the Banking Act of 1935 was adopted.
Extending the loss exposure of stockholders beyond their initial equity investment would increase their incentive to close or to reorganize banks before the institutions became insolvent. In addition, surety bonds protect the FDIC and the uninsured depositors from loss by sewing as an additional buffer between operating losses and creditor claims.
Below we indicate the impact that requiring bank stockholders to post surety bonds has on the cost of capital for banks. As with subordinated debt, the introduction of surety bonds does not affect the cost or value of insured deposit capital. The end-of-period cash flows to uninsured depositors when stockholders post surety bonds are
The value of the uninsured deposits and the required rate of return on these deposits are In other words, extending stockholder liability through the issuance of surety bonds increases the value of uninsured deposits.
The expected cash flows for stockholders who post surety bonds with an end-of-period value of C are
The value of equity and the expected return to stockholders are then:
Equations (21) and (22) show that stockholder-posted surety bonds affect the cost and value of equity capital both by reducing the value of the limited liability put option held by stockholders and by lessening the probability that stockholders will exercise that option.
To sign the effect of a surety bond requirement on the value of equity, we can examine the impact of such a proposal on the cash flows to stockholders :
In equation (23), the sum of the first three terms in parentheses is the reduction in the value of equity that results from the imposition of surety bonds, and the last term is the increase in the value of equity caused by the reduction in promised payments to depositors and the FDIC. Surety bonds should reduce the value of bank equity by reducing the value of the limited liability put option held by bank stockholders. It is unlikely that D would be sufficiently smaller than B to make equation (23) Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) empirically document a negative and significant relationship between the cost of uninsured deposits for thrifts and the presence of depositor preference laws.
